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CHAPTER 18 
Insurance 
J. ALBERT BURGOYNE 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§18.1. Agents and brokers: Liability. During the 1958 SURVEY 
year the Supreme Judicial Court on two occasions considered the po-
tential liability of an insurance agent or broker who fails to provide 
or is dilatory in providing insurance he has undertaken to effect for a 
client. In Rapp v. Lester L. Burdick, Inc. 1 the plaintiff brought an 
action in contract against an insurer and its agent for breach of an 
agreement to act promptly to cause the issuance of an accident and 
health insurance policy and in tort for negligent failure to do so. The 
plaintiff is administrator of the estate of one of more than six hundred 
members of the Advertising Club of Boston who were solicited by the 
agent to purchase insurance policies for which no physical examination 
was required and for which the agent accepted signed applications. 
Each application specifically provided that it was "subject to accept-
ance by the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company, Newark, N.J." 
The deceased made application on November 16, 1950, the agent for-
warded it to the insurance company on December 14, 1950, and the 
policy was issued on January 2, 1951 following the death of the de-
ceased on January 1, 1951. The Court found that no written or oral 
contract for insurance or temporary insurance was in effect at any time 
and consequently no claim existed under the policy. The Court re-
fused to accept the view, which now finds support in perhaps a slight 
majority of the jurisdictions in which the question has been passed 
upon, that unreasonable delay in acting on an application for in-
surance gives rise to a right in tort or implied contract.2 While there 
appears to be some support for the view that considerations of fairness 
and moral obligation should impose liability on an insurer in circum-
stances similar to those in the Rapp case, the needed correction, if any, 
should be accomplished legislatively, not judicially.3 
Rayden Engineering Corp. v. Church 4 was an action against a firm 
J. ALBERT BURGOYNE is Assistant Vice President of Liberty Mutual Insurance Com-
pany and Instructor in Law at Boston College Law School. 
§18.1. 1336 Mass. 438, 146 N.E.2d 368 (1957). 
2 See Annotation, 32 A.L.R.2d 487 (1953). 
3 Cf. Prosser, Delay in Acting on an Application for Insurance, 3 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
39 (1935). 
41958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 965, 151 N.E.2d 57; for further discussion of this case, see 
§3.3 supra. 
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of insurance brokers and its employee. The counts in contract alleged 
a failure to perform an undertaking to effect, for the plaintiff's benefit, 
a policy of insurance against accidental death of the plaintiff's em-
ployee and breach of an agreement that coverage would be bound im-
mediately; the counts in tort alleged negligence in the performance of 
the undertaking to effect insurance and negligent failure to notify the 
plaintiff that the insurance had not been placed, with consequent loss 
to the plaintiff of the opportunity to place the insurance elsewhere. 
The defendant firm, through its employee, was acting as agent of the 
plaintiff in determining insurance needs of the plaintiff's newly estab-
lished business and in placing policies. Among other policies, the 
plaintiff wanted at once a policy of accidental death coverage on a "key 
employee" who "was kind of a reckless driver." The defendant agent 
in response to the plaintiff's request for this coverage said, "I will take 
care of it, it is all set." About a month later the employee was killed 
in an automobile accident. In the meantime the defendant agent had 
taken no steps to obtain the accident policy. 
The defendant agent had no authority to bind the accident coverage, 
and the Supreme Judicial Court found that the plaintiff could not rea-
sonably assume that coverage was bound forthwith, particularly since 
the latter should reasonably have understood that a contract with its 
employee could not be made without the employee's assent. At most 
the undertaking was to use reasonable efforts to obtain and make effec-
tive thereafter an accident policy on the employee's life. But the agent 
purported to act for the firm with apparent authority and there was, 
therefore, no basis for a finding that the agent was undertaking a per-
sonal commitment that would sustain a contract action against him. 
The Court also affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant firm since 
the contract made was at variance with the contract declared on. The 
averment stated an undertaking to procure the policy, with the im-
plication of a reasonable time within which to do so. Damages for 
breach of such an undertaking are computed on the basis of the pro-
visions of the policy which should have been written. These agree-
ments are, however, materially different from agreements to use reason-
able efforts to procure policies of insurance.5 
The defendant firm failed to perform obligations as an agent, for 
which the plaintiff could recover in tort. There was also evidence 
upon which the agent could have been found negligent as a sub-agent, 
who stands in fiduciary relationship to the principal and is subject to 
all of the liabilities of an agent to the principal except liability de-
pendent upon the existence of a contractual relationship between 
them.6 A majority of the Court sustained directed verdicts on the tort 
counts because the plaintiff failed to show that any negligence of the 
defendants resulted in substantial damage to the plaintiff, apparently 
doubting that a showing could be made that a policy could have been 
obtained, what it would have paid for the particular loss, and whether 
a claim would have been perfected. A motion to amend the declara-
5 Heaphy v. Kimball, 293 Mass. 414, 200 N.E. 551 (1936). 
6 Cf. Seavey, Subagents and Subservants, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 658, 666·667 (1955). 
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tion to eliminate the variance was denied because failure to show sub-
stantial damage would require overruling of the contract counts except 
for nominal damages. Plaintiff should not have a second chance to 
show merely nominal damage. 
§18.2. Accident insurance: Death or injury by accidental means. 
A prolific source of insurance law litigation for years has been those in-
suring agreements that obligate the insurer to payor to indemnify for 
"injury caused by accident," for "accidental injury" or for "injury ef-
fected solely through accidental means." The "accidental means" lan-
guage was involved in two companion cases decided by the opinion in 
Brown v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty CO.I The plaintiff un-
successfully sought to recover double indemnity for accidental death 
under a policy of life insurance covering the life of her husband, and 
the death benefit afforded under an automobile accident policy taken 
out by her husband. Indemnity under each policy was payable only if 
insured's death "results as a consequence of bodily injury effected solely 
through external, violent, and accidental means" and excluded in-
demnity for death resulting "directly or indirectly from disease or from 
bodily or mental infirmity." The deceased, a coronary case for several 
years, suffered injuries in an automobile accident and died less than 
two months later. A clear distinction must be made between a death 
caused by a disease induced by the injury, where recovery can be had 
even though there is a predisposition or other frailty in the absence of 
which death might not have resulted, and the aggravation of a pre-
existing disease by an accident which together with the accident pro-
duces a fatal result, in which event the accident cannot be said to be 
the sole cause of death.2 
§18.3. Life insurance: Incontestable clause. Kramer v. John Han-
cock Mutual Life Insurance CO.I was an action in contract brought by 
the beneficiary of a life insurance policy issued by the defendant in-
surer upon the life of the beneficiary'S husband. The policy contained 
a typical "Policy when Void" clause making the policy "voidable by 
the Company" with respect of any claim for death occurring before the 
policy becomes incontestable if prior to the date of issue of the policy 
the insured had "any disease of the heart" and this fact is not endorsed 
on the policy. The insured died before the policy became incontest-
able and the insurer introduced medical testimony of a prior heart 
condition. As in the Paratore case,2 involving an identical policy pro-
vision, the Court was of the opinion that compliance with the pro-
visions of this "Policy when Void" clause is a condition precedent to 
the plaintiff's claim despite the express "voidable" language of the 
§18.2. 1336 Mass. 609, 147 N.E.2d 160 (1958); the additional case decided by the 
same opinion was Brown v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 
2 Leland v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 233 Mass. 558, 564-
565, 124 N.E. 517, 520 (1919). 
§18.3. 1336 Mass. 465, 146 N.E.2d 357 (1957). 
2 Paratore v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 335 Mass. 632, 141 N.E.2d 
511 (1957), discussed in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §28.2. 
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policy. Testimony of physicians, who had examined the insured some 
years prior to the policy date, as to the fact of heart disease but not its 
exterior cause, including the electrocardiograms taken by one of them, 
was therefore improperly excluded by the trial court. 
§18.4. Motor vehicle insurance: Ways of the Commonwealth. In 
Farrell v. Branconmier1 the plaintiffs sought to reach and apply in 
satisfaction of judgments held by the plaintiffs against the defendant 
Branconmier the obligation of the defendant insurer under a compul-
sory motor vehicle liability policy. The Court found that an accident 
that occurred in a park area with no roads, paved or unpaved, that 
adjoined an ocean beach and was used generally for parking and entry 
to the beach and public buildings was not an accident that happened 
"upon the ways of the commonwealth," as required under the com-
pulsory policy,2 and defined as "any public highway, private way laid 
out under authority of statute, way dedicated to public use, or way 
under the control of park commissioners or body having like powers." 3 
§18.5. Motor vehicle insurance: Title to insured vehicle. Middle-
sex Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance CO.l was 
a suit in equity to determine the liability of an insurer, which had 
issued to an automobile dealer a policy of theft insurance which by its 
terms covered "automobiles owned by the insured and held for sale 
... but excludes automobiles sold under a conditional sale, mortgage, 
lease, or similar agreement," and the liability of another insurer, which 
had issued to a customer of the automobile dealer a policy of insurance 
covering a 1946 automobile. The dealer had executed with its cus-
tomer a purchase and sale agreement for a 1950 automobile, taking in 
trade the 1946 automobile, and assisted the customer in transferring 
the motor vehicle registration and the insurance afforded by customer's 
policy from the 1946 to the 1950 automobile, but retained physical 
possession of the 1950 automobile pending payment of the balance of 
the purchase price. Before payment, the automobile was stolen from 
the dealer's premises and subsequently recovered badly damaged. The 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the transfer of the registration, to-
gether with the other facts, justified the conclusion that the parties 
intended to transfer title upon execution of the purchase and sale 
agreement. Thus neither insurer had any liability to the automobile 
dealer, the first because its contract covered only automobiles owned 
by the dealer and held by it for sale, and the second because its con-
tract covered only the interest of the dealer's customer. 
§18.6. Policy conditions: Notice of accident. The plaintiff in Segal 
v. The Aetna Casualty and Surety CO.l was insured under a policy of 
liability insurance issued by the defendant insurer. One of the plain-
tiff's tenants using a common stairway was seized by an epileptic fit, 
§18.4 1 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 633, 149 N.E.2d 363. 
2 G.L., c. 90, §34A. 
SId. §l. 
§18.5. 1336 Mass. 315, 145 N.E.2d 723 (1957). 
§18.6. 1 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 435, 148 N.E.2d 659. 
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fell to the cellar and was taken to a hospital where he died two months 
later. The insured, apparently believing the accident was not within 
the policy coverage or that no claim would be brought, gave no notice 
of the accident to the insurer as required by the policy. Two months 
after the tenant's death and four months after the accident, the plain-
tiff received a notice of claim from an attorney for the deceased's estate 
which he promptly forwarded to the insurer. The Court held that 
even if this can be considered a notice of accident, despite the clear dis-
tinction in the policy between notice of accident and notice of claim, 
it was as a "matter of law" given too late to comply with the policy 
provision requiring a notice of accident within a reasonable time and 
the insurer was therefore not obligated to defend. A notice of accident 
is required to give the insurer an opportunity to investigate the cause 
and nature of a claim while the facts are still fresh in the minds of the 
parties and the insurer cannot be deprived of this contractual right. 
In O'Kane v. The Travelers Insurance CO.2 the plaintiffs had ob-
tained judgments against the operator of an automobile not owned by 
him. The operator was, however, an insured under a policy of in-
surance issued to the owner of the automobile by the defendant in-
surer. The plaintiffs sought to reach and apply the property damage 
liability obligation of the policy. The operator gave the defendant 
no notice of the accident or claim, no copy of the summons, employed 
his own counsel, did not himself testify and in no way cooperated with 
the insurer. Consequently he has no rights against the insurer and his 
judgment creditors can have no greater rights. Neither can the plain-
tiffs reach the interests of the owner in the insurance for they are not 
his judgment creditors. 
§18.7. Policy conditions: Proof of loss. The Supreme Judicial 
Court affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant in Smith Beverages, 
Inc. v. Metropolitan Casualty CO.l because of the plaintiff's failure to 
comply with policy requirements that proof of loss by alleged burglary 
be furnished to the insurer within sixty days from the date of discovery 
of the loss. Seasonable filing of the prescribed proof of loss was a 
condition precedent to the defendant's liability under the policy. 
Failure to file bars recovery unless the failure is excused or waived. 
No showing was made that the defendant refused to furnish a proof 
form or that there was any formal or written waiver of filing proof of 
loss "by endorsement ... signed by a duly authorized representative 
of the company." Mere failure to provide proof forms does not con-
stitute a waiver. 
§18.8. Policy conditions: Assistance and cooperation. Two cases 
decided during the 1958 SURVEY year involved the "Assistance and Co-
operation" clause in a motor vehicle liability policy. Polito v. Gal-
luzzo l was an action to reach and apply the noncompulsory provisions 
21958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 431, 148 N.E.2d 397. 
§18.7. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 531, 149 N.E.2d 146. 
§18.8. 1 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 627, 149 N.E.2d 375. 
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of the defendant's motor vehicle liability policy in satisfaction of a 
judgment obtained by the' plaintiff against the defendant as a conse-
quence of injury sustained while riding as a guest in the defendant's 
motor vehicle on May 1, 1953. The original suit was brought on Sep-
tember 30, 1953 and the insurer entered an appearance for the de-
fendant and agreed to assume the defense under a reservation of rights. 
The defendant signed and returned interrogatories sent to him on 
July 13, 1954. Notice sent to the defendant on October 5, 1955 ad-
vising of the approach of trial was returned undelivered. A constable 
sent to summon the defendant as a witness on the day before trial was 
unable to locate him, and he did not appear at the trial on November 
2, 1955. The trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
has no greater rights under the policy than the defendant insured. 
Disappearance of the insured and his failure to notify the insurer of 
his change of address were a material breach of the cooperation clause 
and warranted a disclaimer. An insurer knowing that it possesses suf-
ficient grounds to disclaim cannot pursue the trial to a conclusion and 
then, an adverse result having been reached at the trial, disclaim 
liability. The insurer in the Polito case, however, defended under a 
reservation of rights and there was no way for it to notify the insured 
of his failure to cooperate. The insurer faced the serious question of 
whether to withdraw and leave the defendant unprotected or to try the 
case and put in a defense. Under these circumstances the Court af-
firmed the decree dismissing the bill as against the insurer. 
McKissick v. The Travelers Insurance CO.2 involved quite a different 
situation. In a previous action judgment was obtained against Mc-
Kissick by a minor injured by McKissick's negligent operation of a 
motor vehicle owned by the minor's father and insured under a motor 
vehicle liability policy issued by the defendant in this action. The 
minor judgment creditor then brought a bill in equity to reach and 
apply the insurer's obligation under the policy; the bill was dismissed 
upon a finding that the minor's father and McKissick had deliberately 
given false testimony with intent to deceive in material matters, had 
highly prejudiced insurer in its defense efforts, and had violated the 
cooperation provision of the policy.3 There is some suggestion that 
had the evidence been truthfully given in the original suit it probably 
would have sustained recovery. The present case is an action in con-
tract by McKissick to recover the amount of the judgment obtained by 
the minor. The defendant seeks a declaratory judgment based upon 
an affidavit 4 of finding of the judge in the equity suit to which Mc-
Kissick was not a party. The Court held that a bill in equity to reach 
and apply the proceeds of an insurance policy is a separate proceeding 
from an action in contract on the policy and is not res judicata as to 
it; it further stated that the findings of the judge in the equity suit as 
such would not be admissible if the contract action went to trial. 
21958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 759,150 N.E.2d 3. 
3 Williams v. Travelers Insurance Co., 330 Mass. 476, 115 N.E.2d 378 (1953), dis-
cussed in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §18.6. 
4 G.L., c. 231, §59. 
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§18.9. Policy conditions: Subrogation. Two cases came before the 
Supreme Judicial Court during the 1958 SURVEY year as a consequence 
of the exercise by each of two insurers of the right of subrogation under 
policies of automobile collision insurance. In the first of these cases, 
Bell Finance Co. v. Getter,! the Court held that an assignee of the con-
ditional vendor of an automobile could maintain an action to recover 
the full amount of collision damage to the automobile caused by the 
defendant's negligence even though the conditional vendee was not in 
default on the note given under the conditional sale agreement. At 
the time of the accident the automobile was being driven by the con-
ditional vendee, who was free from contributory negligence. The 
Court relied upon Morris Plan Co. v. Hillcrest Farms Dairy, Inc.,2 
which established the rule that the conditional vendor of an automo-
bile could recover from a third person for negligently damaging the 
automobile while it was in the possession of a conditional vendee in 
default, notwithstanding the latter's contributory negligence. In the 
Morris Plan case the Court rejected the argument that a conditional 
sale is not a bailment as a ground for refusing recovery and asserted 
that a conditional vendor should have a right of action when a bailor 
would have one. 
The Bell Finance case may be distinguished from the Morris Plan 
case, in which the conditional vendee was in default and the sum owed 
the plaintiff under the conditional sale agreement exceeded the 
amount of the damages, but, in the view of the Court, these distinc-
tions were not so essential that the plaintiff should be denied recovery. 
Even though the conditional vendor or his assignee has no right of 
possession until default, he does have a security title to assure the pay-
ment of the debt and has a right to have his security unimpaired. It 
is upon this title to the property that the right of action against the 
third party is based and full recovery can be had, at least where, as 
here, there is no contributory negligence on the part of the conditional 
vendee. If the amount recovered exceeds the amount of the debt, the 
surplus must be held for the benefit of the conditional vendee. 
Perhaps a logical extension of these cases is Harvard Trust Co. v. 
Racheotes,3 which involved an automobile mortgaged to the plaintiff 
to secure a loan and damaged in a collision caused by the concurring 
negligence of the mortgagor and the defendant, the amount of the 
damage exceeding at the time of the accident the unpaid balance of 
the loan which was not in default. The mortgagor's insurer paid for 
the collision damage and the automobile had been restored to its 
condition prior to the accident. The Court agreed with the plaintiff 
that a chattel mortgagee should have similar rights to those of the con-
ditional vendor but here faced the question of how much the mortgagee 
§18.9. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 305, 147 N.E.2d 815. This case is further commented 
on in §§3.2 and 7.2 supra. 
2323 Mass. 452, 82 N.E.2d 889 (1948). 
31958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 309, 147 N.E.2d 817. This case is further commented on in 
§§3.2 and 7.2 supra. 
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should recover when the amount of the damage exceeds the unpaid 
balance of the loan and the mortgagor was contributorily negligent. 
To permit the mortgagee to recover for damage to the security more 
than the amount owed on the mortgage would permit the unjust en-
richment of the mortgagor. Consequently, the Court limited the 
amount of recovery to the amount of the loan then unpaid. 
These cases, each involving relatively trifling sums, represent efforts 
of automobile physical damage insurers to transfer property losses to 
liability insurers. The cases establish the rule that the potential right 
of repossession in the conditional vendor or chattel mortgagee is a suf-
ficient interest to permit recovery for damage to the security even 
though the security may have been promptly restored by the insurer. 
As a practical matter, they may have the effect of giving an additional 
settlement value to difficult intersectional collision and other contribu-
tory negligence cases. The losses are all paid but additional expense is 
incurred, and sometimes, as here, new law is made as a redistribution of 
these losses among insurers is sought through subrogation actions. 
Legislative correction should, and very likely will, be sought for this 
situation. In cases such as these the conditional vendor or chattel 
mortgagee should be subject it would seem to the same defenses as 
would be available in a suit by the conditional vendee or chattel 
mortgagor. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§18.10. Motor vehicle insurance. Since it became effective on 
January I, 1927, the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance 
Law 1 has each year received considerable legislative attention. In 
recent years an alarming increase in the number and cost of auto-
mobile accidents and the consequent increase in the cost of automobile 
insurance has intensified interest in the operation and administration 
of the compulsory insurance system and focused attention upon the 
compulsory insurance rates set by the Commissioner of Insurance. 
These factors resulted in the creation in 1956 2 of a special commission 
to investigate and study the motor vehicle laws and the insurance laws 
as they relate to motor vehicles. This special commission was revived 
and adequately financed in 1957 3 and continued in 1958.4 
Bills relating to the matters within the scope of the commission's 
investigation were referred in 1958 to the commission. Considerable 
time and effort has been devoted to a detailed study of the motor ve-
hicle and insurance laws, and also to the problems of highway safety 
and traffic law enforcement, motor vehicle registration and driver 
licensing, the handling of damage suits and the curbing of exaggerated 
or fraudulent claims, all of which contribute to the mounting loss 
§18.l0. 1 G.L., c. 90, §§34A-34J. 
2 Resolves of 1956, c. 125. 
3 Acts of 1957, c. 402, §2. 
4 Resolves of 1958, cc. 27, 102. 
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costs that determine rate levels. Up to the close of the 1958 SURVEY 
year, no legislation has been enacted. The commission is expected to 
report its findings and recommendations to the General Court on or 
before the last Tuesday of December, 1958. 
Of particular importance to the insurance companies was the repeal 
by Acts of 1958, c. 369 of the so-called Fielding Act 5 which required 
that all motor vehicle tort actions be commenced in a District Court. 
Effective September I, 1958 the~e actions may be brought in either the 
District Court or in the Superior Court. This act further enables6 the 
Superior Court on its own motion or on the motion of a plaintiff or 
defendant to transfer any action of tort or contract, including motor 
vehicle tort cases, to the District Court upon a determination that 
there is no reasonable likelihood that recovery will exceed one thou-
sand dollars. These actions must be tried in the District Court by a 
full time justice. Any aggrieved party may as of right have the case 
retransferred to the Superior Court for determination by that court, 
with the decision of the District Court and the amount of damages 
assessed prima facie evidence as to the issues raised by the pleadings. 
These changes should do much to relieve the congestion of cases in the 
Superior Court. 
§18.11. Accident and health insurance. In 1954 Massachusetts en-
acted the Uniform Individual Accident and Sickness Policy Provisions 
Law,l approved in 1950 by the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners as a substitute on a national basis for the 1911 Standard 
Provisions Law for Accident and Health Insurance Policies. Legisla-
tive efforts at standardization of insurance policy provisions appear 
inevitably to fall short of the desired uniformity from state to state. 
The original Massachusetts enactment introduced two modifications;2 
two additional modifications were adopted during the 1958 SURVEY 
year. Acts of 1958, c. 277 3 provides that no claim for loss incurred or 
disability commencing after two years (heretofore three years) from the 
issue date of the policy shall be reduced or denied because of a pre-
existing disease or physical condition not specifically excluded from 
the coverage of the policy. Acts of 1958, c. 294 repeals the provision4 
by which an insurer may reserve the right of policy cancellation. 
Under the law as amended the insurer may refuse renewal of a policy 
but only upon thirty days' prior notice to the insured of intent not to 
renew.1i Except for termination for non-payment of premium, any 
reserved right to refuse renewal may not be exercised except upon an 
1\ G.L.. c. 218. §19. as amended by Acts of 1954. c. 616. §1, discussed in 1954 Ann. 
SurV. Mass. Law §§4.7. 25.1. 27.6; G.L .• c. 223. §2. as amended by Acts of 1955. c. 158. 
discussed in 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§21.1. 23.10. 
6 G.L., c. 231. §102C. as added by Acts of 1958. c. 369. §3. 
§18.ll. 1 G.L., c. 175. §108. added by Acts of 1954. c. 275. 
2 See 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§18.4, 18.5. 
3 Amending G.L.. c. 175. §108. d. 3(a)(2). 5th par. 
4 Id., d. 3(b)(8). 
II Id .• d. 3(a)(3). 
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anniversary of the policy or, in the event the policy has lapsed, upon 
an anniversary of its most recent reinstatement.6 The changes with 
respect to cancellation and non-renewal appear to be an effort to 
achieve some balance between the need of the insured to maintain 
coverage into his advancing years and the needs of insurers seeking to 
make available low cost policies or experimenting with the develop-
ment of newer forms of coverage. 
Only one significant legislative development with respect to group 
accident and sickness insurance seems worthy of mention. For the 
tenth time in as many years a bill 7 to provide compulsory non-occupa-
tional disability benefits for Massachusetts workers was rejected by the 
House of Representatives and failed to reach the Senate. This type of 
legislation, enacted in four states,S during the early postwar years 
seemed destined for adoption generally. Since 1949, however, no state 
has adopted a compulsory system and there appears to be no non-
political demand for this legislation. 
§18.12. Life insurance. Acts of 1958, c. 114 amends the statute 
regulating the issuance of policies of life and endowment insurance 1 
to permit the issuance of single life insurance policies on the lives of 
two or more members of a family upon an application signed by either 
parent, a step-parent, or by a husband or wife. 
Acts of 1958, c. 188 amends the definition of group life insurance2 
to permit group life insurance to be written not only on borrowers 
and conditional purchasers, but also on guarantors or conditional guar-
antors of the debtors' obligations. 
Acts of 1958, c. 410 enacts a new section3 in the insurance law mak-
ing a minor who has attained the age of eighteen years competent to 
give a valid discharge for payments not exceeding $2000 annually 
under an insurance policy, annuity contract or settlement agreement, 
provided the insurer has not had prior notice of the appointment of 
a guardian of the minor's property. 
Acts of 1958, c. 117 enables savings and insurance banks to issue, 
under the Savings Bank Life Insurance Law,4 policies of payor in-
surance but without otherwise increasing th~ aggregate amount of 
insurance that may be issued by one or more such banks on anyone 
life. 
§18.13. Group insurance: Public employees. Acts of 1958, c. 424 
requires that a pro rata share of the dividends or other refunds or rate 
credits received by the Commonwealth on policies insuring the pay-
ment of benefits under the Group Insurance Plan for Employees of 
6 Added as id., d. 3(b\l'2). 
7 House No. 642. 
S Rhode Island (1943), California (1946), New Jersey (1948), New York (1~49). 
§18.12. 1 G.L., c. 175, §123. 
2 Id. §133(c). 
8 Adding new §128A to G.L., c. 175. 
4 G.L., c. 178, §10. 
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the Commonwealth1 shall be applied to the reimbursement of federal 
or other funds contributed in place of the Commonwealth's share of 
the premium cost as, e.g., in the case of employees whose salaries are 
paid in part from federal funds. 
Acts of 1958, c. 355 enables the State Employees' Group Insurance 
Commission to empower the executive secretary of the commission2 to 
appoint the employees necessary for the administration of the group 
insurance plan and to make payment of the required premiums. 
Acts of 1958, c. 301 amends the state employees' group insurance 
plan3 to make employees of a mosquito control project eligible for 
insurance. 
Acts of 1958, c. 136 amends the Group Insurance Plan for Employees 
of Counties, Cities, Towns and Districts4 to make certain employees of 
redevelopment authorities in cities and towns eligible for insurance. 
§18.14. Insurance companies. Acts of 1958, c. 155 was enacted to 
permit the acquisition of one insurance company by another by an 
exchange of stock. The statute governing increases in capital stock 1 
no longer requires that new stock must be offered to stockholders but 
it may, at the discretion of the directors, be disposed of for cash, 
property, services or expenses in whole or in part without being offered 
to the stockholders. 
Acts of 1958, c. 296 2 authorizes investment by domestic insurance 
companies in consolidated debentures of the federal intermediate 
credit banks and the banks for cooperatives organized under the laws 
of the United States. 
Acts of 1958, c. 177 modifies the requirements with respect to the 
annual statement of life insurance companies3 to require a schedule 
showing each bank in which an account was maintained together with 
the year-end balance and also the largest balance each month in any 
bank in which the largest balance carried during the year exceeded the 
smaller of one-fortieth of one percent of admitted assets of the in-
surance company or five hundred thousand dollars. 
§18.l3. 1 C.L., c. 32A, §9, added by Acts of 1955, c. 628, discussed in 1955 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §17.3. 
2 C.L., c. 32A, §3. 
3 Id. §2(b). 
4 Id., c. 32B, §13, added by Acts of 1955, c. 760. 
§18.14. 1 C.L., c. 175, §70. 
2 Adding new paragraphs l4D and l4E to C.L., c. 175, §63. 
3 C.L., c. 175, §25. 
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